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Abstract 
This paper examines the argument that trade liberalization depresses the 
import duty revenue, and consequently adversely affects the total tax 
revenue. The study is thought to be significant because Tanzania 
experiences difficulty in replacing import duty revenue loss as a 
consequence of trade reform by strengthening its consumption tax system.  
In the course of analysis, cointegration analysis and error correction 
modelling are employed over the 1979/80-2009/10 period. The empirical 
results show that import duty revenue-to-GDP ratio is positively related to 
tariff rates, implying that a reduction in the tariff rates results in a 
significant loss of import duty revenue. The results also show that the 
removal of protectionist policies led to an increase in import-to-GDP ratio 
which in turn led to rising shares of import duty revenue in GDP. Finally, 
the results generate some policy implications. The proper issue in tax 
design under trade liberalization, Tanzania needs to strengthen the 
domestic tax system and raise tax revenue without increasing tax rates by 
reinforcing tax and customs administrations so as to maintain fiscal 
stability. 
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1. Introduction 
Many representatives of development institutions and most academics 
believe that trade liberalization, combined with other economic and 
structural reforms, stimulate competition, enhance productivity, and 
accelerate economic growth. Research by the World Bank, for example, 
shows that per capita income in developing countries integrating rapidly 
into the global economy grows more than three times as fast as in other 
developing countries (Dollar and Kraay, 2001). Rapid growth in many Latin 
American countries in the late 1980s and 1990s came about with domestic 
policy liberalization and open-economy models, which reduced trade 
barriers. There is therefore, a wide and growing consensus regarding the 
need for all countries especially developing countries, to adopt a liberalized 
trade regime. 
 
Tanzania being a member of World Trade Organization (WTO) could not 
avoid the increased global integration. However, a significant concern, as it 
contemplates further trade liberalization, is the potential impact of trade 
liberalization on tax revenues, and the core issue being its ability   to 
substitute domestic sales taxes such as VAT and excise taxes for import 
duties. Trade liberalization is most likely to pose serious fiscal problems to 
Tanzania as it relies on international trade taxes for a large share of its total 
revenue.  
 
Trade liberalization involves progressive elimination of tariffs and at the 
limit may push trade tax revenue to zero.  Available evidence from previous 
studies suggests that revenue recovery has been a real issue for many 
developing countries.  At best, they have on average recovered no more 
than 30 cents of each lost dollar (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005). This 
explains in part the hesitance of many countries to undertake trade 
liberalization and the limitations to their sustainability.  
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Many developing countries have implemented trade reforms while 
avoiding significant revenue losses. The prospects for further trade 
liberalization are likely to depend in part, on the extent to which they will 
cause trade tax revenue to decline further and whether countries are able 
to deal with such revenue losses. Arguably, the IMF and World Bank have 
until now in almost all cases pressed trade liberalization up on low-income 
countries as part of structural adjustment by asking for the removal of 
tariffs. Thus, the main issue should not be the reduction of revenue from 
trade but of total tax revenue. If the fall in the trade taxes had been easily 
compensated by increase in other taxes, most obviously by strengthening 
domestic indirect taxes, then these would not be a problem. Tanzania is a 
good case study to analyze these challenges since Tanzania’s reliance on 
international trade taxes remains higher, relative to many other sub-Sahara 
African countries (DiJohn, 2010).  
 
The main objective of this paper is to examine the impact of trade 
liberalization on import duty revenue in Tanzania. Specifically, the study 
aims at examining the effect of trade liberalization-proxied by a decline in 
collected tariff rates and accompanying macroeconomic changes such as 
exchange rate, per capita GDP and imports on import duty revenue. It also 
examines the relationship between import duty revenues and domestic tax 
revenues (domestic consumption taxes and income taxes) to uncover 
whether Tanzania can replace import duty revenue loss from domestic 
sources. 
 
The study is important because there has been relatively little empirical 
research on the impact of trade liberalization on tax revenue in Tanzania. 
Studies of the extent to which import duty revenue responds to trade 
liberalization and that lost trade tax revenues have been recovered from 
domestic sources reach somewhat different conclusions, reflecting 
differences in countries and time samples, methodologies and in the source 
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of the revenue data. The study fills this gap in information by piecing 
together empirical evidence on some aspects of the Tanzanian tax system. 
 
Tanzania has committed itself to a process of trade liberalization in the 
framework of the World Trade Organization. It is therefore, important to 
anticipate the impact of trade liberalization on tax revenue and take the 
necessary actions in a timely fashion if it is concluded that the impact could 
be significant. These issues need to be related to the specific circumstances 
of Tanzania. General answers as provided by previous studies in other 
countries are not likely to be very helpful for Tanzania since the structure 
of the economies, the sophistication of the tax administrations; or political 
obstacles vary across countries. 
 
2. Tax Revenue Concerns of Trade Liberalization  
Tanzania expresses concern that eliminating tariffs for non-agricultural 
products would trigger fiscal instability because of its high reliance on 
tariffs as source of revenue. Because tariff receipts are collected at specific 
locations (i.e. customs clearance points), they are generally considered to 
benefit from lower collection costs than most other taxes. This might 
explain why despite their sub-optimality tariffs are frequently used as 
revenue device by low-income countries (Aizenman, 1985). In Tanzania, 
the share of import tax revenue in total tax receipts in 1993-2005 
amounted to more than 25 percent. Africa as a whole, international trade 
taxes generate on average 28 percent of total current revenues over the 
last decade (UNECA, 2004). This compares to 0.8 for high-income 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and 23 
percent for low-income countries (UNECA, 2004).  
 
Recognizing that trade reform is vital to economic development and 
poverty reduction; developing country policymakers have lowered tariffs, 
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and reduced non-tariff barriers,  the argument being that when tariffs are 
very high or prohibitive, products may be under-invoiced, smuggled, or not 
imported(Amponsah, 2002). When tariffs are reduced to reasonable rates, 
products are more likely to enter a country through formal means and have 
duties paid on them. This may increase overall revenue, even if the average 
tariff rate is low. In addition, when tariffs are reduced and the cost of 
imports declines, demand for imports is likely to increase. At least in the 
short-term the volume of imports and therefore tariff revenue may, 
depending on elasticities of demand, increase.  However, Tanzania’s tax 
revenue as percent of GDP declined from 17.8 percent in 1979/80 to 9.8 
percent in 1998/99 (Table 1). The IMF (2003) reports that policy 
sequencing attributes to the revenue decline. For example, tariffs were 
lowered too quickly before compensatory tax broadening measures and a 
strengthened tax administration were in place (IMF, 2003).  With tariff 
rates declining overtime, revenues from import duties as a share of total 
revenue have also tended to decline, particularly between the second half 
of 1990s and the 2000s, but they remain important sources of revenue 
because they are relatively easy to collect.  Table 1 indicates that revenue 
from import duty as a percent of total revenue declined from 15.4 percent 
in 1996/97 to 8.4 in 2009/10 partly as a result of the reduction in trade 
tariffs (African Development Bank Group, 2009). Decrease in total tax 
revenue and import duty revenue is closely linked to an overall trend 
towards trade liberalization-proxied, for example, by a decline in collected 
tariff rates (Figure 1).  
It is widely recognised that trade liberalization does not necessarily reduce 
revenue from trade taxes when it involves cutting tariffs that are initially 
set for protective reasons so as to increase trade volume by more than 
enough to offset the direct revenue loss from lower rates. Trade 
liberalization also may not reduce trade taxes when it is accompanied with  
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Table 1: Various Tax Revenues as Percent of Total Tax Revenue and of GDP, 1979/80-2009/10 
 
YEAR TAX 
REVENUE 
                                        TRADE TAXES        SALES/VAT INCOME TAX OTHER TAXES 
  
% of GDP 
IMPORT DUTY  SALES/VAT ON   
IMPORT 
EXCISE ON 
IMPORT 
      
 % of 
GDP 
% Total 
Tax 
% of 
GDP 
%Total 
Tax 
% of 
GDP 
%Total 
Tax 
%of 
GDP 
%Total 
Tax 
%of 
GDP 
% of 
GDP 
%of 
GDP 
% Total 
Tax 
 
              
1979/80 17.8 2.1 11.9 0.5 3.0 0.3 1.8 7.7 43.2 6.3 35.3 1.4 7.8 
1980/81 18.2 1.5 8.1 0.9 5.0 0.4 2.0 9.7 53.3 6.1 33.5 0.6 3.1 
1981/82 16.4 1.2 7.3 1.2 7.0 0.2 1.1 9.1 55.3 5.8 35.0 0.2 1.3 
1982/83 15.1 1.0 6.5 1.2 7.7 0.5 3.3 8.2 54.2 5.1 33.8 0.3 2.2 
1983/84 18.1 1.3 7.0 2.0 10.9 0.9 5.0 10.4 57.7 5.4 29.8 0.1 0.5 
1984/85 21.6 1.9 8.8 1.1 5.0 1.4 6.6 12.1 55.8 6.0 27.8 0.2 1.1 
1985/86 19.4 1.5 7.7 0.7 3.8 0.7 3.8 9.5 48.8 6.4 32.9 1.3 6.8 
1986/87 18.5 2.5 13.8 2.3 12.4 0.4 2.0 10.8 58.7 4.6 24.9 0.1 0.6 
1987/88 12.9 1.8 13.7 1.1 8.4 0.5 3.7 6.9 53.4 2.9 22.9 0.8 6.5 
1988/89 12.5 1.6 13.0 1.5 12.0 0.5 4.2 6.6 52.7 3.0 23.9 0.8 6.2 
1989/90 12.9 1.9 14.8 1.3 10.5 0.5 4.0 4.5 35.1 3.1 23.9 2.9 22.2 
1990/91 14.2 1.4 9.5 1.2 8.1 0.7 5.1 2.4 17.1 3.0 23.5 7.2 44.8 
1991/92 14.1 1.5 10.4 1.2 8.3 0.8 5.4 4.1 29.3 3.0 21.3 4.8 33.7 
1992/93 10.7 1.5 14.0 1.0 9.4 0.2 1.9 3.0 28.0 3.4 31.8 2.6 24.3 
1993/94 12.8 1.4 11.0 1.0 7.8 0.1 0.8 3.7 28.7 3.2 25.1 4.4 34.5 
1994/95 
 
13.0 1.8 13.8 1.2 9.2 0.4 3.1 3.2 24.2 3.4 26.1 4.3 
 
32.9 
 
 
Notes: Sales/VAT includes sales/VAT on domestic and import consumption.   
               Income Taxes include PAYE and corporate tax.  
              Other taxes include domestic excise duty, other income taxes, other import charges, and other domestic charges  
               Source: Computed using data from Bank of Tanzania: A Review of the Role and Functions of the Bank of Tanzania (1961-2011 and 
                                Tanzania Revenue Authority: National Tax Statistics, 2011. 
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Table 1 Cont…Various Tax Revenues as Percent of Total Tax Revenue and of GDP, 1979/80-2009/10 
 
YEAR TAX 
REVENUE 
                                        TRADE TAXES    SALES/VAT INCOME TAX OTHER TAXES 
  
% of GDP 
IMPORT DUTY  SALES/VAT ON   
IMPORT 
EXCISE ON 
IMPORT 
      
 % of 
GDP 
% Total 
Tax 
% of GDP %Total 
Tax 
% of 
GDP 
%Total 
Tax 
%of 
GDP 
% 
Total 
Tax 
%of 
GDP 
% 
Total 
Tax 
%of 
GDP 
% Total 
Tax 
 
              
1995/96 12.7 1.9 15.0 1.2 9.4 0.7 5.5 3.1 24.7 3.4 26.8 3.6 28.1 
1996/97 13.4 2.1 15.4 1.5 10.8 0.8 5.9 3.2 24.1 3.3 24.8 4.0 29.9 
1997/98 11.9 1.7 14.6 1.6 13.6 0.5 4.0 2.9 24.6 3.2 26.7 3.6 30.1 
1998/99 9.8 1.4 14.2 1.7 17.0 0.4 4.2 3.5 35.6 2.5 26.0 2.0 20.1 
1999/00 9.8 1.2 12.4 1.5 15.4 0.3 3.1 3.1 32.0 3.9 29.9 2.2 22.6 
2000/01 10.6 1.2 11.2 2.2 21.1 1.1 10.0 4.0 37.4 2.7 25.1 1.7 16.3 
2001/02 10.7 1.0 9.2 2.3 21.4 1.2 10.7 4.1 38.4 2.8 26.1 1.7 15.5 
2002/03 11.0 1.0 9.4 2.4 21.9 1.0 8.9 4.3 39.5 3.0 27.3 1.6 14.9 
2003/04 11.5 1.1 9.5 2.5 21.1 1.0 8.7 4.4 38.6 3.3 29.2 1.6 13.9 
2004/05 12.1 0.8 6.3 3.1 26.0 0.9 7.6 5.2 43.1 3.7 30.3 1.5 12.7 
2005/06 12.7 1.1 8.8 3.1 24.9 0.8 6.3 5.2 41.4 4.0 31.6 1.5 12.0 
2006/07 14.6 1.4 9.4 2.6 17.7 1.7 11.9 4.9 33.8 4.8 32.6 1.8 12,4 
2007/08 16.5 1.5 8.8 2.6 15.9 2.1 12.7 5.3 31.7 5.3 31.9 2.5 14.9 
2008/09 16.8 1.5 9.0 2.6 15.4 1.9 11.4 5.4 32.1 5.5 32.4 2.5 15.1 
2009/10 16.3 1.4 8.4 2.7 16.6 1.9 11.7 5.3 32.5 5.3 32.8 2.4 
 
14.6 
 
Notes: Sales/VAT includes sales/VAT on domestic and import consumption 
            Income Taxes include PAYE and corporate tax 
            Other taxes include domestic excise duty, other income taxes, other import charges, and other domestic charges. 
            Source: Computed using data from Bank of Tanzania: A Review of the Role and Functions of the Bank of Tanzania (1961-2011)  
                           and Tanzania Revenue Authority: National Tax Statistics, 2011 
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Figure 1: High Income and Low Income Countries:  
Collected Tariff Rates, 1979-2010 
 
            Source: IMF TPIDB  
            Bank of Tanzania A Review of the Role and Functions of the Bank of Tanzania, 1961—2011. 
                 Tanzania Revenue Authority: National Tax Statistics, 2011. 
 
reducing distorting exemptions and addressing corrupt administration. 
However, trade liberalization must reduce trade tax revenue because free 
trade ultimately means no import duty revenues. Collected tariff rates are 
now low in Tanzania relative to levels that are likely to be revenue 
maximizing. Khattry and Rao (2002) for instance, estimate the revenue 
maximizing tariff rate for low income countries to be in the order of 38 
percent, while Ebrill et al. (1999) put it at around 24 percent. It is notable 
that with the collected tariff rate, around 6.2 percent between 1997/98 and 
2009/10, Tanzania has collected tariff rates below revenue maximizing 
average tariff rates set by Khattry and Rao (2002), and Ebrill et al. (1999). 
The collected tariff rate was around 10 percent in 1996, whereas import 
duty revenue -to-GDP ratio accounted for 2.1 percent. In 2010, the 
collected tariff rate and import duty revenue share in GDP, respectively 
accounted for 8.4 and 1.4 percent, after several years of fluctuations. This 
implies that trade values are likely to prove much less responsible to 
further lowering of tariff rates, and therefore tax revenue from trade may 
fall and consequently a fall in government revenue.  
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 Tanzania has been unable to recover import duty revenue loss from trade 
liberalization through strengthened domestic taxation, as a result total tax 
revenue as a percent of GDP has on average declined in parallel with 
import tax revenue. These concerns are emerging ever more clearly as 
potentially significant obstacles to further liberalization. However, total tax 
revenue-to-GDP ratio improved in recent years partly due to improvement 
in revenue collections through excise duty and VAT on imports.  Moreover, 
it is expected that, the efficiency gains from trade liberalization means an 
increase in aggregate real income, part of which could be captured as 
government revenue through income tax and hence, minimizing the loss 
arises from tariff rate reduction. Several features however, characterize the 
income tax regime in Tanzania, which accounted for 28.7 percent of total 
tax revenue and 4.1 percent of GDP during the 1979/80-2009/10 period. 
First, it has been mainly limited to the formal sector and the number of 
individuals subject to personal income is small. Second, the effectiveness of 
rate progressivity is undercut by high personal exemptions and deductions 
that benefit those with high incomes. The problem of exemptions and 
deductions tends to narrow the tax base and negate effective progressivity. 
Thus, the decline of total tax revenue as a percent of GDP in Tanzania 
occurs not only as a direct consequence of declining import duty revenue-
to-GDP ratio, but also as a result of declining income taxes as a percent of 
GDP.  
 
3. Literature Review 
3.1. Theoretical Rationale for Trade Liberalization and Tax Revenue 
Considerable evidence has accumulated overtime that trade liberalization 
is linked to higher rates of economic growth, which is its main objective 
(Escolano, 1995). Trade liberalization stimulates a better reallocation of 
resources in terms of comparative advantage and can also stimulate long-
run growth through the accumulation of capital and technology for 
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developing countries. The link between economic openness and growth is 
quite strong; for example, while developing countries in Latin America and 
sub-Saharan Africa that followed import substitution industrialization 
strategies experienced relatively lower growth rates, East Asian countries, 
that employed export-promotion policies, consistently outperformed other 
countries. This enhanced growth leads to expansion of tax bases, with a 
concomitant expansion of revenue potential. Overtime the influence of 
economic growth on revenue may dominate the influence of shorter-term 
changes in the trade regime. A higher per-capita income reflecting a higher 
level of development is held to indicate a higher capacity to pay taxes as 
well as a greater capacity to levy and collect them (Chelliah, 1971).  
 
Although, trade liberalization is expected to enhance economic efficiency 
and growth, it is widely recognized that the effect of cutting tariff is 
ambiguous. On one hand, lower tariffs imply lower tax rates and hence 
smaller revenues. On the other hand, the volume of imports tends to 
expand when tariffs are reduced and hence the tax base will follow suit. 
The normal argument is that rationalizing the tariff system reduces 
opportunity and incentive for evasion so compliance increases, and so 
revenue may increase. Higher tariffs create an incentive for importers to 
evade tariff or seek exemptions (Pritchett and Sethi, 1994). In turn, tax 
evasion affects the productivity of the tax system leading to a less than 
proportionate increase in tariff revenue. Which of the two effects is larger 
will depend on the demand elasticity of imports. If the elasticity is 
sufficiently high and tax compliance is high, then revenue should increase.  
 
Trade liberalization is often accompanied by a devaluation of nominal and 
real exchange rates. This raises the domestic value of imports, with a 
positive effect on trade tax revenues. But the domestic cost of government 
spending programmes will increase. Consumption will switch from 
tradable to non-tradable goods, trade tax revenue will therefore decline 
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and those from domestic indirect taxation will increase. The overall effect 
of devaluation is therefore ambiguous. Long-run effects may be driven by 
enhanced growth performance as a result of trade liberalization. If growth 
increases then increased income levels will translate into a large base for 
domestic direct taxation (UNECA, 2004).  The trade liberalization measures 
and their implications on the revenue can be positive, negative and neutral 
depending on the nature of restrictions and the characteristics of a 
particular country (Ebrill et al., 1999).  When the trade regime is very 
restrictive because of high tariff rates, trade volumes are likely to be 
reduced. Reducing restrictions will result in a strong increase in trade 
volumes. But when the trade regime is faintly already liberalized, further 
reduction in restrictions will not cause a sufficiently large increase in trade 
volumes to offset the lower tariffs. This effect is illustrated by a “Laffer” 
curve, tracking the relationship between revenues and the trade 
restrictions (average “realized” tariffs), being defined as import duty 
revenue divided by import value.  
 
3.2. Empirical Evidence on Trade Liberalization and Tax Revenue 
The relationship between trade liberalization and tax revenue has been 
debated in economic literature, especially in the last two decades. In 
general, the revenue implications of trade liberalization are uncertain. 
Agbeyegbe et al. (2003), using a panel of 22 countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa, over the 1980-1996 period, report that the revenue impact of trade 
liberalization is limited. Overall, revenue tends to be least affected if the 
initial position of the trade regime is highly restrictive and if liberalization 
is accompanied by reforms in customs and tax administration with the aim 
to broaden tax base. Postulating a first-order dynamic panel model with a 
number of explanatory variables, they find evidence that trade 
liberalization is linked to higher tax revenue and trade tax revenue. They 
also find that the exchange rate is not generally strongly linked to revenues.  
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By contrast Khattry and Rao (2002) find that the impact of trade 
liberalization on revenue is significantly negative. For the aggregate sample 
of 80 countries both developed and developing countries over the 1978-99 
period, and applying a number of regressors on tax revenue regression and 
trade tax revenue regression, Khattry and Rao (2002) find that domestic 
indirect tax revenue-to-GDP and the trade-to-GDP ratios are significantly 
and negatively correlated indicating that customs duties on tradables are 
particularly replaced by domestic indirect taxes on tradables. They also 
find that there is strong evidence that structural factors play a significant 
role in determining the trade tax revenue-to-GDP ratio across countries. 
For example, tax revenue-to-GDP ratio varies positively with the level of 
development while the share of trade taxes in GDP varies inversely with 
the level of development. Moreover, reduced protection adversely affects 
overall tax revenue and trade revenue receipts. In addition, low income 
country group face declining tax revenue-to-GDP ratio in the awake of 
trade reform, which is associated with substantial increase in the debt-to-
GDP ratio. They conclude that trade liberalization in developing countries 
results in revenue losses due to inability to compensate for forgone tariff 
revenue by raising higher revenue from domestic sources. 
 
Similarly, the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2004) study for 
fiscal implication of trade liberalization on African countries reveals that 
trade liberalization is a potential source of fiscal instability for Africa 
countries because of their high dependence on international trade tax. 
UNECA (2004) applies the Generalized Method of Moments of Arellano and 
Bond (1991) to estimate both tax revenue and trade tax revenue 
regressions for all African countries except Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Eritrea, Liberia, Libya, and Somalia over the 1980-2002 period. The main 
finding of that study is that the decrease in trade tax revenue can be 
matched by an increase in revenue from domestic tax, and in particular 
most countries increased reliance on VAT. The study concludes that sound 
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macroeconomic environment is critical to preventing fiscal distress during 
trade liberalization. By achieving a sound macroeconomic stance e.g. low 
and predictable inflation, high GDP growth etc. countries can progress 
toward fiscal stability during liberalization period. Moreover, effective 
institutional reform is likely to help fiscal consolidation. 
 
In a review of African countries experience of fiscal impact of trade 
liberalization, Fukasaku (2003) finds that the overall impact of trade 
liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa is ambiguous and depends on a 
multiplicity of facts such as the nature and sequencing of reforms. 
Examining a database of 22 African countries, he finds that trade 
liberalization has contributed to declines in the ratio of trade-to-total 
government revenue of more than 20 percent in Mauritius, more than 10 
percent in Côte ďIvoire and Senegal, and more than 5 percent in Cameroon, 
Tunisia, and Mozambique. In most countries, domestic resources 
mobilization was somewhat weaker. Similarly, Ebrill et al. (1999) find that 
many developing countries have implemented trade reform while avoiding 
significant revenue loss. In some cases revenue increases because a 
country’s reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers generates more 
imports. Mexico and Chile witnessed such revenue increases in short term, 
when they implemented liberalization programs in the 1980s (WTO, 2003).  
Ebrill et al. (1999) study concludes that trade liberalization could be 
tailored to avoid adverse consequences. For example, revenue objectives 
can be met when reductions in tariffs are accompanied by improved 
customs administration and reduction in exemptions, non-tariff barriers, 
and regulations. Nevertheless, in the long-term, trade liberalization 
inevitably reduces the total share of revenue derived from trade taxes. To 
ensure that revenue is maintained, domestic tax reforms must accompany 
trade liberalization. But such reforms take time to develop and implement. 
Eventually, however, trade liberalization must reduce trade tax revenue 
simply because free trade ultimately means no trade taxes and many 
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countries are now likely to be in this situation. Some countries have 
resorted to other sources of government revenue, such as income, excise, 
or value added taxes (Ebrill et al., 1999).  
 
Paudel (2006) examines the revenue implications of World Trade 
Organization (WTO) regime and alternative measures for revenue 
mobilization in Nepal for the1975-2005 period. He argues that about 25 
percent of the import duty is lost with the fulfillment of WTO commitment. 
Paudel (2006) estimates the time series trade regression equation applying 
variables such as import duty as percent of GDP, import trade as percent of 
GDP, real effective exchange rate, un-weighted overall average tariff rate, 
and dummy variable as a proxy for trade liberalization. He observes that 
import-to-GDP ratio increased after the trade liberalization whereas the 
average (collected) tariff rate declined in the same period indicating that 
the increase in import-to-GDP ratio may not be sufficient enough to offset 
the loss of revenue due mainly to declining trade taxes in the short-run. He 
concludes that the higher import-to-GDP ratio appears to compensate for 
the reduction in trade revenue arising from the trade liberalization in a 
long-run. 
 
Matlanyane and Harmse (2001) apply the ordinary least square on annual 
time series data from 1974-2000 to estimate the productivity of trade tax 
revenue and to establish the effect of trade liberalization on tariff revenue 
in South Africa. The trade tax equation is estimated in linear logarithmic 
form where customs revenue is used as proxy for international trade tax 
revenue and dummy variable for liberalization. Their main finding is that 
customs revenue is highly productive. In addition, trade liberalization has a 
significant influence on customs revenue and that an increase in import tax 
rate leads to a reduction in trade tax revenue. On the other hand, 
Matlanyane and Harmse (2001) find that supportive macroeconomic 
policies are a prerequisite for successful trade liberalization.  
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In different studies, Blejer and Cheasty (1990) and Tanzi (1989) conclude 
that the net impact of trade reform on revenue is an empirical matter. 
Rodrik (2001) argues that the benefits of trade reform have been oversold 
and that economic policy should focus on growth and not trade. Rodrik 
(2001) critizes the standard trade theory and the argument by Edward 
(1993) that, suggest that there is a strong empirical correlation between an 
open trade policy and economic growth since trade liberalization has a 
positive effect on exports growth. However, Rodrik (1995) shows that 
there is a robust negative relationship between per capita income and the 
share of trade taxes in total tax revenue: an increase in per capita income of 
US$1,000 is associated with a reduction by 3.7 percent points in the share 
of trade tax revenue. The usual explanation is that in the countries with 
poor administrative capabilities trade taxes may be the easiest way for 
governments to raise revenue (Kubota, 2000; and McLaren, 1998).  
 
3.3. Knowledge Gaps 
It is noted that the empirical studies have not resolved the debate over the 
impact of trade liberalization on tax revenue. The empirical findings have 
been mixed because of their sensitivity to set of countries and the period of 
analysis. While trade liberalization can help accelerate integration in the 
world economy and strengthen an effective growth strategy, it cannot 
ensure its success. Other elements that address binding constraints to 
growth such as macroeconomic management, trade related infrastructure 
and institutions are needed. Unlike South-East Asian countries, which are 
more competitive and integrated into the global economy, moving from 
export of raw materials to a more dynamic integration focused on high 
technology product, Tanzania, and other sub-Saharan Africa countries have 
great difficulty in dealing with their increasing impact of trade 
liberalization on tax revenues.  For example, the economy of Tanzania is 
mainly characterized by low-income and based on subsistence agriculture, 
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which is difficult to tax.  Moreover, budgetary income is closely tied to 
international trade revenue. From this viewpoint, trade liberalization could 
create a considerable gap in revenue and might lead to a worsening of 
major macroeconomic imbalances. Most studies on the impact of trade 
liberalization on tax revenue, however, are based on a large sample of 
developing countries, few focuses on specific emerging economy. To fill this 
gap this study examines the revenue implications of trade liberalization in 
Tanzania. This contribution is part of debate and, on the basis of less 
developed country seeks to add some ideas to the relationship between 
trade liberalization and tax revenue. 
 
4. Methodology and Data Description 
4.1. The Theoretical Model 
The share of international trade in the economy is a measure of openness, 
which may also be a proxy for trade liberalization. Certain factors of 
international trade make it more suitable to taxation than domestic 
activities. In Tanzania, the international trade sector is typically the most 
monetized sector of the economy and has gained increasing importance in 
recent years. A positive correlation would be expected between the import 
shares in the economy (IMPORT) and the import duty revenue-to-GDP ratio 
(IDR) as administrative costs of the tax system to this sector should be 
lower than other sectors. The relationship between imports, trade 
liberalization, and import duty, however is not direct. A country that taxes 
imported goods with very high tariffs discourage imports, tariffs may be 
above the level that would maximize revenue from import duties. In this 
case some reduction of import duties, by encouraging more imports, would 
increase and not reduce import duty taxes. For some range of the rate of 
import duty, a lowering of the rate will increase imports by so much as to 
more than compensate for the reduction in the tax rate. In this range, 
imports are elastic with respect to the import duty. There is a point at 
which the level of import duties is such as to maximize revenue from trade 
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taxes. Below this point, however, the reduction in import duties would 
reduce the revenue from import taxes. 
 
Apart from the share of import in GDP, there are other several 
determinants of import duty revenue in Tanzania and other low income 
countries; though any generalization is difficult given the differences in the 
political and economic structure across the countries. The economy of 
Tanzania is characterized by low per capita GDP (pcGDP). Per capita GDP is 
considered to capture the level of development. Higher income countries 
tend to have a more monetized economy and better tax administration but 
less rely on trade taxes, the coefficient of the per capita GDP is, therefore, 
expected to be negative. This is considered to reflect features of Tanzania 
economy with difficulties in administering an effective domestic tax system 
and relatively small share of formal sector in the economy. Farhadian-Lorie 
and Katz (1989) note that tariff taxes are historically been a major source 
of government revenue during the early stages of economic development 
because they are easier to collect than domestic income or consumption 
taxes, owing to the rudimentary status of tax administration, as well as the 
limited availability of tax base. During the later stages of development, 
however, collection costs are expected to fall, dependence on tariff taxes to 
decline, and dependence on indirect taxes to rise.  
 
The effect of macroeconomic policy on import duty revenue is also 
captured in the real exchange rate (RER). Real exchange rate index is 
defined such that an increase indicates a real depreciation and its 
coefficient could in general be expected to be positive, since a real 
depreciation implies higher nominal value of imports and hence increased 
import duty revenue. Nevertheless an overvaluation of the real exchange 
rate-typically brought about by expansionary financial policies-would be 
expected to adversely affect overall economic activities, and thus to lower 
tax revenue.  
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The general advice given by international institutions such as IMF and the 
World Bank to developing countries over past few decades has been to 
replace trade taxes with domestic consumption taxes (CTAX), particularly, 
VAT, and income taxes (DTAX), particularly corporate income tax. However, 
some recent literature challenges this conventional view, arguing that the 
relatively large informal sector in developing countries may justify a 
different tax policy design. For example the income tax base in developing 
countries such as Tanzania is mostly comprised of wages of public sector 
employees because most other taxpayers are self-employed or small 
businesses who evade pay of all, or most of income tax. In addition, taxation 
of personal capital income is easily evaded (IMF, 2005). Similarly, the 
relevant data shows that the performance of VAT was quite satisfactory in 
the initial years but subsequently VAT collection has remained stagnant at 
a certain level. As a result, VAT is unable to meet the objectives for which it 
was introduced. The reasons behind this performance are many, such as a 
relatively small number of VAT tax-payers, exemption of agricultural 
production and other products, and a weak monitoring system. Therefore, 
there is no clear evidence whether Tanzania is able to replace revenue loss 
from international trade through domestic taxes. 
 
4.2. Conceptual Framework 
Since trade liberalization entails reducing tariff rates, then, the revenue 
implications would depend on the elasticities of import demand and supply 
with respect to the tax rates. A sufficiently elastic response would imply 
that revenue would increase as a result a decrease in tariff rates.  
 
The restrictiveness of the trade regime is proxied by the collected tariff 
rate. The relationship between the collected rate of trade taxation and 
import duty revenue is assumed to be nonlinear as prohibitively high rates 
of the trade taxation may lead to declining import duty revenue. A 
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quadratic form is therefore applied to estimate the effects of trade 
liberalization on import duty revenue. The overall marginal effect of tariff 
rate on import duty revenue is then ( )CTR21 2γγ +  and hence depends on 
CTR (see Ebrill et al., 999). The revenue-maximizing rate of trade taxation 
is obtained by solving for CTR in the following equation: ( ) 02 21 =+ CTRγγ , 
that is 21 2γγ−=CTR (see  Khatty and Rao, 2002).   
 
Many studies on the impact of trade liberalization on revenue emphasize 
on policy decisions that tend to replace import duty revenue with 
domestically based taxes such as domestic consumption taxes, both excise 
on goods and VAT to offset any revenue loss from trade liberalization.  
Similarly, efficiency gains from trade liberalization means an increase in 
aggregate real incomes part of which could be captured as government 
revenue through the income tax. Import duty revenue model therefore, 
predicts that Tanzania can compensate revenue loss from trade 
liberalization by raising revenue on domestic consumption of goods and 
services and income taxes. Thus, the model is specified as 
 
          ( ) ( ) tttt RERpcGDPCTRCTRIDR 432210 log γγγγγ ++++=  
                      tttt DTAXCTAXIMPORT εγγγ ++++ 765 .        
   
4.3. Definitions and Expected Signs on Variable Parameters 
 Table 2 presents the definitions and expected signs of variables used in the 
tax ratio equation. For estimation, the collected tariff rate, measured by the 
ratio of import duties to the value of imports, is considered as a proxy of 
degree of liberalization. With this measure, a decline in the index is 
considered to indicate greater trade liberalization.1 The measure is based 
                                                 
1
 The collected import tariff rate (tariff revenues divided by import value) is frequently used as 
a proxy for the level of tariff protection, but changes in this rate do not capture other important 
elements of trade liberalization such as lowering non-tariff barriers (NTBs). For further 
discussion, see Ebrill, Stotsky and Gropp, 1999). 
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on how much tariff revenue is actually collected; it may differ from official 
tariffs because of imperfect collection and measurement errors. Data are 
available to construct the index for fairly long time periods for Tanzania. 
The appropriateness of this measure is also discussed in Ebrill et al. (1999). 
 
Table 2:  Descriptions of Variables 
Source: Constructed from Literature Review 
 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
Variable Abbrev. Definition 
Expected 
Sign 
Import Duty 
Revenue IDR 
Import Duty Revenue as 
Percent of GDP  
    
Collected Tariff 
Rate 
 
CTR 
 
Import Duty Revenue as 
Percent of Import Value 
 
         01 >γ  
 
Collected Tariff 
Rate Square ( )2CTR  
Collected Tariff Rate Square 
(Included to Capture the 
Laffer Curve Effect) 02 <γ  
    
Per Capita GDP pcGDP Log of Real Per Capita GDP 03 <γ  
    
Real Exchange 
Rate RER 
Calculated from Nominal 
Exchange Rate and CPI 04 >γ  
    
Value of Import IMPORT 
Import Value  (Percent of 
GDP) 05 >γ  
    
Domestic 
Consumption 
Taxes CTAX 
Indirect (Consumption) 
Taxes  (Percent of GDP) 
06 <γ  
or 06 >γ  
    
Domestic 
Income Taxes  DTAX 
Direct Taxes (Percent of 
GDP) 
07 <γ  
or 07 >γ  
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The per capita GDP variable is entered in logarithm, while the remaining 
variables are entered linearly because the tax revenue function is assumed 
to be nonlinear in the scale of the economy (as measured by per capita 
GDP) (see  Kattry and Rao, 2002; Ebrill et al.,1999). The study uses the 
ratio of GDP. GDP includes income earned locally that accumulates to non-
residents and excludes income received from abroad by residents, since 
local income accruing to non-residents typically is taxed while remittances 
from abroad typically are not. 
 
4.4. Data Sources and Time Series Characteristics of Data 
4.4.1. Data Sources 
Various categories of tax revenues and data on GDP are obtained from 
Bank of Tanzania: A Review of the Role and Functions of the Bank of 
Tanzania (1961-2011), and Tanzania Revenue Authority: National Tax 
Statistics, 2011. Data on series on macroeconomic variables such as real 
exchange rate, and trade balance (imports and exports) are obtained from 
Bank of Tanzania, the International Monetary Fund (IMF): International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), World Trade Organization (WTO), United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): Handbook of Statistics, 
2006/07 and 2009/10, and the Economic Research Services (ERS)/ USDA: 
International Macroeconomic Data set. 
 
4.4.2. Time Series Characteristics of the Data 
It is widely accepted that regression of non stationary time series may 
indicate significant relationship even if the actual relationship is spurious. 
For empirical analysis therefore, it is important to take into account the 
underlying properties of the processes that generate the time series 
variables, more specifically, whether the variables under consideration are 
stationary and have long-run relationships. In this connection, tests to 
detect non stationarity and determine the order of integration of the 
variables in the model have to be conducted.   
  
34 
 
4.4.2.1. Stationarity and Unit Root Test 
Economic variables that are non-stationary are characterized by a change 
in variance that becomes infinite overtime. In addition, the series wanders 
without reverting to the fixed mean. These characteristics result in 
spurious relations between variables in econometric analysis. The use of 
time series variables in estimating econometric models requires that a 
stochastic process generating the data series be stationary. The stochastic 
process is stationary if all the variables generated have constant mean and 
constant variance over the time.  
 
There are several methods that have been devised to test for unit root in 
time series variables. These methods include Q-statistics, Ljung-Box 
statistics, weighted symmetric test, Phillips-Perron (PP), Dickey-Fuller (DF) 
and Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests.2 The Dickey Fuller (DF), 
Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root tests 
are the commonly used methods to test the stationarity of the time series 
variables.  In this study ADF and PP tests are used. The idea behind the ADF 
and PP unit root tests is that, the ADF and PP tests use different methods to 
control for higher-order serial correlation in the series and have been 
widely used successfully in other studies. The ADF test makes a parametric 
correlation for higher-order correlation by assuming that the series, say 
IDR follows autoregressive process and adjusting the test methodology. 
Moreover, the ADF approach controls for higher-order correlation by 
adding lagged difference terms of the dependent variable (IDR) to the right-
hand side of the regression. Phillips-Perron test is a nonparametric method 
of controlling for higher-order serial correlation in a series. The PP makes a 
                                                 
2
 The ADF test is virtually the same as the DF test, except the lag length has to be long in order 
to reflect the additional dynamics that cannot be captured by the DF test and to ensure that the 
error term is white noise. The ADF is presented as ∑
=
−−
+∆+++=∆
i
i
tititt yytY
1
1 εφδλα , 
where the lag length i is set to ensure that any autocorrelation in tY∆ is absorbed. This 
augmented specification is then used to test the hypothesis that: .0:,0: 10 〈= δδ HH  
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correlation to the t-statistics of IDR coefficient from the AR(1) regression to 
account for the serial correlation in error term )(ε . The correlation is 
nonparametric since we use an estimate of the spectrum of ε  at frequency 
zero that is robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of unknown 
form. There is evidence that the Phillips-Perron test has more power than 
the augmented Dickey-Fuller test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993). If the 
variables are found to be I(1) stationary, the next step is to test whether 
they are cointegrated using the Engle Granger two step procedure , as 
discussed in the next sub section. 
 
4.4.2.2. Cointegration Analysis and Error Correction Modelling 
Economic theory is mostly interested in equilibrium conditions and has 
little to say about the nature of economic configurations in disequilibrium. 
However, the data does not confirm that equilibrium relationships between 
economic variables hold at all times. To overcome this difficulty, 
economists make a distinction between the short-run and the long-run. The 
appeal of cointegration is that it provides a formal framework for testing 
long-run models from actual time-series data. The cointegration analysis 
allows non stationary data to be used so that spurious regression results 
are avoided. It also gives the chance to test the validity of an economic 
theory. If a postulated economic relationship exists, then the variables 
under consideration should be cointegrated. Testing for cointegration is, 
thus, a test for the existence of the equilibrium relationship postulated.  
 
Granger and Engle (1987) two-step estimation procedure and the Johansen 
(1988) procedure are two procedures that are popularly used to identify 
and estimate the cointegrating vectors and the short run adjustment 
parameters. The former procedure involves normalizing the cointerating 
vector on one of the variables, which makes the assumption that the 
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corresponding element of the cointegrating vector is non-zero.3 The 
Johansen procedure is a multivariate approach, the estimation of which 
would consume a lot of degree of freedom. In this study the Engle-Granger 
two-step procedure is performed to test for cointegration between 
variables in a single equation. The Engle-Granger type of static long-run 
regression has become a widely applied method since it was introduced by 
Engle and Granger (1987). Some suggest that the estimates of the Engle-
Granger type static long-run ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression 
parameters are both consistent and highly efficient (Stock, 1987).   
 
5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1.  Unit Root Test 
Test for stationarity of variables before their linear combination was 
conducted using both Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron 
tests. Selection of the numbers of lags was made using t-statistics. The 
variables were tested for unit root using 1 lag. This was done by including 
only a constant and also by including a constant and trend. Constant and 
trend option was selected because it is a general case. The whole process 
was done in levels, first difference, and second difference. The results for 
unit root test are presented in Table 3.  
 
                                                 
3
 Formally, Granger (1983) and Engle and Granger (1987) define that an economic time series 
is said to be integrated of order d , or ( )dI , if it requires to be differenced d times to achieve 
stationarity. If we have an [ ]1×n  vector of variables X , which ( )dI , the series in X  are said 
to be cointegrated if there exists a combination 
                       ttX εβ =′  
such that tε  is ( )bdI − and β is known as the cointegrating vector. The statistical concept of 
cointegration has a natural counterpart in economic theory. The basic idea is that the existence 
of cointegration between a set of economic variables implies that the variables move together in 
the long run, or in other words are in long run equilibrium. In testing for cointegration of 
economic time series, one is also testing for presence (or absence) of a long run relationship 
between them. 
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The results in Table 3 indicate that import duty revenue (IDR), collected 
tariff rate (CTR), domestic (consumption) indirect tax revenue (CTAX), 
income tax revenue (DTAX) and import value (IMPORT) are integrated of 
order one I(1), whereas per capita GDP (pcGDP ) and real exchange rate 
(RER)  are integrated of order two I(2), this suggests that further 
estimation would be carried while in first difference and second difference 
respectively in order to avoid spurious correlation. 
 
Table 3:  Unit Root Test Results 
 Test Statistic  
Variable ADF-test               PP-test I(d) 
 ADF  
t-value 
Test Critical Values PP 
t-value 
Test Critical Values  
 1%Level 5%Level 1%Level 5%Level  
        
IDR -4.3175** -4.3082 -3.5731 -7.1817** -4.2949 -3.5670 I(1) 
CTR -3.8855* -4.3082 -3.5731 -5.8607** -4.2949 -3.5670 I(1) 
PcGDP -4.3749** -4.3226 -3.5796 -8.3082* -4.3082 -3.5731 I(2) 
RER -5.6368** -4.3226 -3.5796 -6.4775** -4.3082 -3.5731 I(2) 
IMPORT -3.1417* -3.6752 -2.9665 -4.2916** -3.5670 -3.2169 I(1) 
CTAX -4.2166** -4.3082 -3.5731 -5.5047** -4.2949 -3.5670 I(1) 
DTAX -4.9195** -4.3082 -3.5731 -4.3737** -4.2949 -3.5670 I(1) 
        
 
Notes :(1)   I(d)= Order of Integration.   
             (2) *(**) denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% & 1% critical values 
                              respectively. 
             (3)   Included in the test equation: (i) trend and intercept (ii) lagged difference (1). 
 
5.2. Cointegration Analysis 
According to Thomas (1993), if an equilibrium relationship exists, then the 
disequilibrium error should fluctuate about zero (Figure 2). This implies 
that stationarity of the error term must be obtained at its initial level. A 
more useful way of cointegration is by using a single equation error 
correction model (SEECM), in which a static regression model is estimated.  
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Figure 2:  Long Run Cointegrating Vector 
 
              Source: Author’s Computation Based on Data from BoT and TRA 
 
Such a method allows for the possibility of including more than one 
independent variables in the static regression (Charemza and Deadman 
1992). Therefore, the Engle-Granger (two-step) single equation procedure 
was used for cointegration analysis. The use of a single equation procedure 
was deemed appropriate, at least with respect to preserving the degree of 
freedom. Table 4 provides a summary of the results of the tests for 
cointegration on the residuals of the long run import duty revenue model. 
Overall, the results show that the errors in the cointegration regression are 
stationary. A comparison of the computed Augmented Dickey Fuller and 
Phillips-Perron (PP) test results tends to support cointegration between 
the tariff revenue and explanatory variables. Both tests reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. 
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Table 4:  Static Model: Tests for Cointegration between Import Duty 
Revenue (IDR) and Explanatory Variables 
 
Augmented Dickey 
Fuller Test on 
Residuals 
ADF-test Order of 
Integration t-value Test Critical Value 
1% Level 5% Level 
-3.053366* -3.6661 -2.9627 I(0) 
 
 
Phillips-Perron 
(PP) Test on 
Residuals 
PP-test Order of 
Integration t-value Test Critical Value 
1% Level 5% Level 
-5.487383** -4.2826 -3.5614 I(0) 
 
    Notes (1) *(**) denote rejection of the null hypothesis at 5% and 1% critical values 
                                     respectively 
                 (2)   Included in the test equation: (i) trend and intercept (ii) lagged difference (1) 
 
 
5.3. Error Correction Model4 
 
In order to capture the short run relationship between the import duty 
revenue and a series of explanatory variables, the error correction model 
was estimated.5 The error correction specification restricts the long run 
behaviour of the endogenous variables to converge to their cointegrating 
relationships while allowing a wide range of short run dynamics. The error 
correction terms ( )ECT  were obtained from the solved static long run 
equation and lagged once, i.e. 1−tECT .  The import duty revenue (IDR) 
equation was therefore specified to include the error correction model and 
the estimation results are presented in Table 5. The model seems to be 
correct as the coefficient of the error correction term is negative and 
                                                 
4
 Error correction model is restricted model that has cointegration restrictions built into the 
specification, so that it is designed for use with non-stationary series that are known to be 
cointegrated. The cointegrating term is known as the error correction term (ECTt-1) since the 
deviation from the long-run equilibrium is corrected gradually through a series of partial short-
run adjustments.  
5
 According to Angle and Granger (1987), when cointegration is established the next step is to 
represent a short-run disequilibrium relationship of the variables using an ECT. 
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statistically significant. The 1−tECT  reflects the attempt to correct deviations 
from the long run equilibrium path and its coefficient can be interpreted as 
the speed of adjustment. 
 
5.4. Estimation Results and Implications 
Estimation results presented in Table 5 show that adjusted R-squared, 
which measures the goodness of fit of the variables, indicates that about 93 
percent of the variations in the import duty revenue is explained by the 
explanatory variables. Similarly, the F-statistic of 48.4 rejects the null 
hypothesis that all explanatory variables have coefficients not different 
from zero. Furthermore, Durbin-Watson statistic (DW) indicates that there 
is no autocorrelation, as the DW statistic of 1.9 lies close to 2. 
 
The results also show that the coefficient of collected tariff rate (CTR) is 
positive and significant at 1 percent indicating that one percent reduction 
in collected tariff rate may lead to about 0.3 percent decline in import duty 
revenue-to-GDP ratio. This confirms the hypothesis that a reduction in the 
tariff rates results in a significant loss of import duty revenue.  The robust 
support is provided for the presence of a significant relationship between 
the import duty revenue-to-GDP ratio and income tax-to-GDP ratio. The 
coefficient of income tax-to-GDP ratio (DTAX) is negative and significant at 
1 percent implying that as income tax-to-GDP ratio (DTAX) increases, 
import duty revenue-to-GDP ratio declines. This also indicates that 
reduction in import duty revenue is partially replaced by income tax 
revenue. Despite the fact that the income tax base is mostly comprised of 
wages of employees in the public sector, because all other taxpayers are 
self-employed or small businesses who evade paying all, or most, of the 
income tax, the ratio of income tax revenue as percent of GDP has increased 
from 3.2 percent in 1993/94 percent to 5.3 percent in 2009/10. This may 
be due to the fact that taxing individual incomes and large corporations 
does not involve significant administrative and compliance costs, because 
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they are per force required to comply with statutory accounting 
requirements. 
.  
Table 5: Empirical Results 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
 
Std. Error 
 
t-Statistic 
 
Prob 
.  
     
Constant (C) -0.012185 0.016903 -0.720858 0.4789 
Collected Tariff Rate (CTR) 0.306477 0.031940 9.595361*** 0.0000 
Collected Tariff Rate Sq. ( )2CTR  -0.008512 0.001306 -6.515447*** 0.0000 
Percapita GDP (Log pcGDP) 0.281468 1.939755 0.145105 0.8860 
Real Exchange Rate (RER) -0.000158 0.000172 -0.915851 0.3701 
Import Value (IMPORT) 0.091261 0.006900 13.22704*** 0.0000 
Domestic Indirect Taxes (CTAX) 0.056619 0.022980 2.463865** 0.0225 
Income Taxes (DTAX) -0.116275 0.035441 -3.280849*** 0.0036 
1−tECT  -1.039844 0.232587 -4.470773*** 0.0002 
    
R-squared 0.948593   
Adjusted R-squared 0.929009           Akaike info criterion -1.684266 
S.E. of regression 0.092298           Schwarz criterion -1.263907 
Sum squared resid 0.178897           F-statistic 48.43794 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.899900           Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
    
        Notes: * significant at 10 percent; **Significant at 5 percent; ***Significant at 1percent. 
 
The coefficient of consumption taxes-to-GDP ratio is positive and 
significant at 5 percent. The positive relationship between indirect taxes 
and import duty revenue-to-GDP ratios may be due to the fact that informal 
sector and exemptions tend to narrow the tax base; as a result 
consumption indirect taxes (VAT and excises)-to-GDP ratio does not grow 
significantly to replace import duty revenue loss. Moreover, this result is 
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contrary to the general advice of international institutions such as the IMF 
and the World Bank given to developing countries over the past few 
decades, that these countries need to replace import duty revenue with 
domestic consumption taxes, particularly value-added tax (VAT) and to 
maintain relatively high corporate income tax rates. The main reason for 
this controversy is that, while this assumption is automatically satisfied 
when an economy consists of only the formal sector, it is not a plausible 
assumption in the presence of a large informal segment in the economy 
that, by definition, escapes VAT coverage. Furthermore, the 
macroeconomic environment in Tanzania does not support revenue 
recovery as coefficients of percapita GDP (pcGDP) and real exchange rate 
(RER) are insignificant. 
 
The coefficient of import value as a percent of GDP (IMPORT) is positive 
and significant at 1 percent indicating that one percent increase in import-
to-GDP ratio may increase import duty revenue-to-GDP ratio by 0.09 
percent. This is consistent with the theory that higher import-to-GDP ratio 
is seen to lead to rising shares of import duty revenue in GDP. However, 
due to the complex nature of Tanzania import trade like exemptions, 
informal trade, highly inelastic essential import, it is difficult to make 
conclusive remark on the magnitude of the impact of import on import tax  
revenue both as the percent of GDP. 
 
As expected, the result confirms the hypothesis that there is a diminishing 
revenue return to increase in the tariff rate, as the square term is negative 
and significant at 1 percent. Specifically the coefficient suggests that there 
is a revenue-maximizing tariff rate. In other words, the negative magnitude 
of collected tariff rate square ( )2CTR suggests that a potential “Laffer effect” 
exists for trade tax revenue.6 This also confirms that for a given value of 
                                                 
6
. The Laffer curve suggests that, as taxes increase from low levels, tax revenue collected by the 
government also increases. For example, for income tax, the curve shows that tax rates 
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imports declared to customs, smuggling and the ratio of imports coming in 
with exemption increase as the tariff rate increases. This is because first, 
the value of imports coming in under non-exemptions decreases while the 
value coming in under exemption remains constant. Second, the incentive 
to lobby for exemption increases with the level of tariff.   
 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of trade liberalization 
proxied by reduction in collected tariff rate and other determinants of tax 
revenue that are associated with trade liberalization and reforms. In 
estimating the import duty revenue model, cointegration analysis and error 
correction modeling were applied. The study findings showed that trade 
liberalization is a potential source of fiscal instability in Tanzania because it 
relies heavily on revenue from international trade. Trade liberalization 
eventually results in reduced import duty revenue and, hence, will raise 
difficult fiscal issues if appropriate steps have not been taken to strengthen 
the domestic tax system. This implies that implementing comprehensive 
reform of the domestic tax system from the outset of liberalization should 
be viewed a priority.  
 
Because Tanzania relies on the international trade taxes for a large share of 
its total revenue, the policy challenge is how to maintain fiscal stability 
under trade liberalization. The experience of industrial economies shows 
that at advanced stages of economic development the revenue side of the 
budget can be structured in such a way to achieve a stable fiscal position 
even with negligible import duty revenues. Therefore, it is possible that 
indirect effects operating through higher levels of income and openness 
associated with trade reform have more than offset the direct loss of 
revenue. However, this is complicated in Tanzania because of limited 
                                                                                                                                  
increasing after a certain point would cause people not to work as hard or not at all, thereby 
reducing tax revenue. Eventually, if tax rates reached 100 percent (the far right of the curve), then all 
people would choose not to work because everything they earned would go to the government. 
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economic base and ability to tax it. The tax base in Tanzania tends to be 
narrow, excluding relatively important sectors in the economy that are not 
fully monetized or incorporated in the formal economy, such as large 
segments of agriculture, small-scale trade and services.  
 
In Tanzania, the consumption tax revenues (excises and VAT) have not 
improved to recoup revenue loss from trade liberalization. There are, 
however, several low income countries that have recovered import duty 
revenue loss from domestic sources, and their experience provides useful 
lessons for Tanzania. It suggests, in particular, that strengthening the 
domestic consumption tax system, through the excises and, in particular by 
means of a simple, broad-based VAT, has a crucial role to play; and in 
contrast to the standard theoretical prescription that consumption taxes 
take the burden of revenue recovery, the strengthening of income tax can 
also make an important contribution.7 This strategy, focused on a shift 
towards domestic consumption taxes, has considerable practical merit.  
 
Direct tax revenue can also be increased through strengthening the tax 
collection system and eliminating tax holidays and other exemptions. The 
personal income tax should be characterized by only a few brackets and a 
moderate top marginal rate by limited personal exemptions and 
deductions. The corporate income tax should be levied at moderate rate, 
tax incentives should be avoided, and depreciation allowances should be 
uniform across sectors. Furthermore, fiscal stability during trade 
liberalization requires a stable macroeconomic environment, with low and 
predictable inflation, steady growth in per capita GDP, and appropriate 
exchange rate policies. 
                                                 
7
 These issues are discussed at length in Ebrill, Stotsky, and Gropp (1999), Agbeyegbe, Stotsky, 
and WoldeMariam (2004), and Khattry and Rao (2002).  
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